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BOOK REVIEWS
By Donald G.
Morgan. University of South Carolina Press, 1954. Pp. 326.

JusTic" WI,,IAM JOHNSON TrHz FIRST DISSeNTeR.

This volume portrays the career of a South Carolinian who was
the son of a blacksmith, was educated at Princeton, studied law
under Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, was a member of the State
Legislature, was speaker of the House of Representatives, a State
Judge and for over thirty years Associate justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
William Johnson was the first Republican appointed on the Court
by President Jefferson. At the time of his nomination March 22,
1804, Johnson was the youngest man ever appointed on the Court,
being but a little over thirty-two years of age.
As the representative of Jeffersonian democracy, Johnson faced
formidable obstacles on the Supreme Court. He was but one against
five. His youth was another liability. The other five judges were
his seniors. The Court in 1805 included in addition to Johnson,
William Cushing, seventy-two, Samuel Chase, sixty-three, William
Patterson, fifty-nine, John Marshall, forty-nine, and Bushrod Washington, forty-two.
Johnson possessed talent, versatility, an inquiring mind and indefatigable industry. Princeton lit a spark which was never put
out. Yet he never quite shook off the combativeness of the advocate
and the great James L. Petigru thought he lacked the judicial temperament of a great judge.
Over the long stretch of thirty years what impact did William
Johnson make on the Supreme Court? It is clear that Marshall and
the Federalist tradition exerted a profound influence on him. "Few
could match the Chief Justice for geniality or intellectual acumen.
For three decades the two worked at close hand; yet Johnson, so
far as our records show, uttered scarcely a whisper of criticism of
the presiding judge. Indeed, it may have been Marshall's integrity
of character that led Johnson to assert that the 'pure' men of both
the parties were in basic agreement on fundamentals."
Johnson, then, embraced Marshall's esteem for nationalism and
in general concurred in Marshall's great decisions that imparted life
to the Constitution.
Johnson's decision in Gilchrist v. Collector' strikingly illustrates
1. 10 Fed. Cas. 355, No. 5420 (1808).
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his judicial independence. It was a matter of astonishment and resentment to Jefferson that this, the first judicial act of interference
with his Embargo Laws, should come from his own appointee to
the Court, the young Judge, William Johnson, and from the strong
Republican State of South Carolina. This case arose in the United
States Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina. Under the
Embargo Act collectors of customs were required to detain any
vessel ostensibly bound with cargo to United States ports, whenever
in their opinion the intention was to evade the Embargo. In the
enforcement of this law, Jefferson had directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to instruct collectors to detain all vessels loaded with provisions and such a letter was sent out, in spite of the fact that the
statute expressly vested the collectors with the right of determination as to detention. A test of its legality was at once made when
a vessel owner in Charleston petitioned for a mandamus to require
the collector to grant a clearance of a vessel bound for Baltimore and
loaded with rice, clearance of which had been refused by the collector, acting under the Presidential instructions. Judge Johnson heard
the case in Charleston, announced his decision, granting the mandamus and holding Jefferson's instructions to the collector to have
been illegal and void, as unwarranted by the statute. Johnson was
then only thirty-six years of age and this decision was rendered only
four years after his appointment on the Supreme bench by a Republican President.
Virginia and South Carolina had enacted statutes directed against
the entrance of free Negroes into the State, and providing for their
detention in custody until the vessel in which they arrived should
leave port. By these statutes the South attempted to protect itself
against the possibility of insurrectionary movements being stirred up
amongst the slave population by the presence of free Negroes from
Northern States. In the fall of 1823, however, eight months before
the decision by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden,2 Judge
Johnson had met the issue in a case in the Circuit Court for the
District of South Carolina, and he held the South Carolina statute
unconstitutional, stating that the right of the Federal Government
to regulate commerce between the states was "a paramount and exclusive right". 3
This decision was bitterly resented by South Carolina, Johnson's
native State. However, the officials and Courts of South Carolina
2. 22 U. S. 1 (1824).
3. 2 WARREN, ThE SUPRIME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY
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-continued for over twenty-five years to disregard Judge Johnson's
-opinion. The episode is a striking illustration of Johnson's judicial
independence and of his concurrence with Marshall's view as to the
scope of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, although the
Supreme Court did not pass upon the particular issue decided by
Johnson in the case referred to.
This episode also is a striking illustration of the fact that, throughout the years when the question of the extent of the Federal power
over commerce was being tested in the Court, that question was, in
the minds of Southerners, generally coincident with the question
of the extent of the Federal power over slavery.
Mr. Associate Justice Johnson not only stood consistently for broad
powers in Congress, but openly resisted nullification by South Carolina, thereby becoming very unpopular in his beloved native State.
But if Johnson shared much of Marshall's nationalism and some
of his devotion to the security of property, he broke with the great
Chief Justice on other issues, particularly with respect to the role
of the judiciary in our Constitutional system.
Professor Morgan devotes considerable space to Jefferson's effort
to procure seriatim opinions by the judges on the Supreme Court
and to Johnson's emphasis on the value of dissenting opinions. Particularly during the last ten years of his service on the Supreme
Court he dissented in a considerable number of cases. However, as
this reviewer reads the opinions of the Court, Johnson was not strictly speaking the first dissenter. Prior to the advent of Marshall to
the Chief Justiceship many of the judges wrote separate opinions,
expressing their individual convictions. Marshall wrote most of
the great decisions involving constitutional questions and most of
those decisions were unanimous. What of it? The fact of unanimity undoubtedly added prestige to the Court and made for national
unity. There is a time to dissent and a time not to dissent. Johnson
began to dissent on certain issues at the appropriate time.
During the last ten years of his service on the Court, if a hard
and fast line can be drawn, Johnson's dissenting opinions indicated
that his nationalism "had at its core the dominance of Congress.
Marshall sought to elevate judicial power; Johnson, the power of
the national legislature. Not that he denied the existence of a power
to review national statutes. Where constitutional provisions were
explicit, he would have intervened even against Congress, for the
Constitution he deemed positive law of the highest order. It was
rather that he left to the representative body control of a large meas-
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ure of the Court's jurisdiction and the initiation and implementation
of national improvements and regulations." (p. 295)
Johnson, then, particularly during the last ten years of his service
on the Supreme Court frequently disagreed with the decisions of
Marshall's Court and with the extreme doctrine of States Rights
in his native State.
This volume, based on an enormous amount of research, is not
only the biography of a great personality whose constitutional philosophy was grounded largely in the experiences of his father, a patriot
leader during the Revolution, but is also a portrayal of the development of our Constitution from its early origin to its modern interpretation.
That we have survived as a nation; that we are the oldest Republic,
the oldest federal system with the oldest written Constitution; that
we have avoided a violent revolution from the Right or the Left;
that we are still striving as did Marshall and Johnson to strike a
fair balance between the powers of the central government and those
of the States- all of these prodigious achievements accrue from the
judicial philosophy of judges like Marshall and Johnson, to the extent at least that our judicial process under a written Constitution
plays a noble part in the making of a nation.

CHARLES B. ELLIOTr.*

0

Former Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
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TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST RiVOLUTION.

Berle, Jr. New York:
Pp. 192. $3.00.

By Adolf A.
Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1954.

Adolf Berle's absorbing interest in economics and politics is not
new to economists or to lawyers. His acute mind operates not at the
extreme technical level but at the more humane and broader level
where the implications of economic science cross over into economic,
social, and political practice.
Mr. Berle and Gardner C. Means produced The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932. Including the present volume
Mr. Berle has authored five books and been co-author of three. He
has contributed many articles and book reviews to various publications. Throughout his written work and in his vocations as lawyer,
professor, politician, government administrator, and diplomat one
finds an active, honest, and agile mind applied with clarity of language
to the major problems of contemporary business life. Indeed, the
scope of MvIr. Berle's activities and unusually successful attainments
in several different and difficult fields - he is only 59- is phenomenal.
Mr. Berle is representative of the uncommon liberal in American
life; the kind of man who does not cast a vote against business because it is big, or, who is not for labor because people must work.
He is concerned with the aspirations of individual people as well as
groups of people. He is chary of stereotypes. It is important to specify
these aspects of Mr. Berle's character, for they place him among the
small but vibrant group of creative liberals in American life.
These are significant distinctions, for this new book does not contain quantitative documentation as did The Modern Corporation;
rather it is a kaleidoscopic analysis of what the corporation is and
what it must become if democratic capitalism as practiced in the
United States is to prevail; grow; and prosper.
The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution concerns the place
that giant corporations have assumed in American life. In this sense
the book represents an epilogue to The Modern Corporationand Private Property. The Modern Corporationexamined the quantitative
aspects of big business while The Twentieth Century CapitalistRevolution considers the qualitative effects that big business has upon the
life and environment of the whole community. "Their (corporations)
importance in the American state is obvious, whether considered as
means of production, instruments of distribution, sources of occupation, or agents of economic progress." (p. 17) Or in somewhat
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broader terms, "The mid-twentieth century American capitalist system depends on and revolves around the operations of a relatively
few very large corporations." (p. 28) The corporation as an institution reaches down into the lives of people throughout the nation.
Its influence is beneficial to some, detrimental to some, and both to
still others. It is this that causes Mr. Berle to remark, "It is, in fact,
an institution at a cross road in history, capable of becoming one
of the master tools of society-capable also of surprising abuse;
worthy of the attention of the community as well as of scholars."
(p. 22)
Berle is cognizant that the "most notable achievements of the
twentieth century corporations have been their ability to concentrate
economic power in themselves and their ability to increase production and distribution." (p. 25)
Economists and the public are aware of the "concentrates" -a
few large firms which dominate activity in various industry groups.
But economists, particularly those well versed in static theory, have
appeared skeptical about the extent to which such concentration can
be taken. All would-be economists are submitted to repeated if not
always intellectually satisfying explanations of the law of variable
proportions or as it is sometimes phrased the law of diminishing returns. This principle is quite satisfactory for measuring the point
of optimum production under static conditions. The only difficulty
is that we do not find static conditions in American manufacturing
or agriculture. A new idea, a new process, a new invention "pops
out" of Schumpeter's entrepreneur or from the research activities
of corporations and other agencies of our nation. Such unsettling
events push up the point of optimum output and enable producers
to enlarge the size of their operations.
J. A. Schumpeter thought that the death of the entrepreneur might
mean the end of capitalism. In his book, Capitalism, Socialism, and
Democracy he ponders, "Can capitalism survive? No. I do not
think it can." He assumed, of course, that no new conditions would
intrude upon the system which would change the basis upon which
his conclusion was drawn. It was the entrepreneur- innovator
and promotor- who caused the constant revolutionizing of the
means of production in the capitalist state. And this individual has
all but disappeared from capitalist life in America. But, has something else taken the place of the entrepreneur? It would seem that
this question must be answered before the nation is committed (academically, at least) to another "ism". For, perhaps, the passing of
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the entrepreneur is merely the result of capitalism's vitality. Maybe,
after all, we are embarking upon a new era of dynamic capitalism.
Schumpeter's entrepreneur was (this reviewer agrees) the vital
element in the nineteenth century individually competitive economy.
Out of that economic setting grew up the oligopolies of the twentieth
century. It is Mr. Berle's belief that corporate management today,
"has been given the power and the means of more or less planned
economy, in which decisions are or at least can be taken in the light
of their probable effect on the whole community." (p. 35) Within
the vast circumference of this belief the corporation comes to life.
No longer can it be merely a "legal person". It must now acquire
blood, tissue, viscera, and brains. Its directors must be statesmen
and reformers, for their usefulness is not confined solely to the organization they represent, but to the community. That the great
power of modern corporations should be used to further the growth
and development not only of business but of education, political
science, and ethics is a concept that outmodes previous generalizations
framed against the background of "economic man".
It is Mr. Berle's thesis that this power, carefully yet valiantly
used, might be the savior of capitalism. Corporate weaknesses are
weighed against corporate strengths and Mr. Berle finds that capitalism in partnership with the modern corporation can achieve great
economic and social results. He does not believe that corporations
can build any "City of God", but rather that they can protect and
maintain them.
Is Berle overly optimistic about the willingness or capacity of
corporate management to assume the role of chief benefactor of free
educational institutions without imposing restrictions upon the objectivity of research and teaching functions within their walls? This
reviewer cannot say. Certainly Berle believes the corporation inust
come to the aid of our institutions of higher learning without impairing the responsible independence of mind which is the heart and
soul of any educational effort worthy of the name. He sees the corporation bearing the fruit of an independent educational system in
the form of trained men and women who graduate and move into
the corporate life of our nation, and in the social and natural science
research projects that form the basis for product development and
management improvement in industry. He assumes that corporate
management will be intelligent enough to put its money to work in
support of long-run advantages rather than corrupt education by short
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sighted attempts to gain 100 per cent ideological conformity for the
going business philosophy.
Mr. Berle has again produced a volume that should do much to
enlighten and stimulate economists and lawyers. He has done more
than this because The TwentietA Century Capitalist Revolution is a
book that can be and should be read by lawyers, economists, educators,
and the general public.
ROBERT W. PATERSON.*

0

Assoclate Professor of Economics and Associate Director, Bureau of Business and Economio Research, University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C.
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COGITArIONS ON TORTS.

By Warren A. Seavey. Roscoe Pound
Lectureship Series, University of Nebraska Press, 1954. Pp. 72.

To one who has studied or taught the law of torts from Professor
Seavey's casebook,' reading these lectures is like a visit with an old
friend. Mr. Seavey, Bussey Professor of Law at the Harvard Law
School retires from that position this year after 49 years as a law

teacher, beginning in 1906 in China. This little book distills some of
the wisdom and learning accumulated in those years.

The principles of the law of torts are largely of very recent discovery and development. Prior to the abolition of the forms of
action,2 there could be no theory of torts. There was only a theory
of trespass, or of trespass on the case, or of trover. In 1870, Oliver
Wendell Holmes perhaps could provoke no great dispute with his
statement that torts was not a worthy subject for study in law schools. 3

But by 1894 Wigmore 4 and others were seeking broad principles
underlying all the cases. Since that time, the courts and scholars
have gone far to create a consistent body of law in this subject, and
Professor Seavey has himself contributed greatly to that effort.5
Now he sums up his philosophy of torts in these brief sentences :6

.... I hope [these essays] will be sufficient to remind you that
the law of Torts is based on the principle that one who harms
another has a duty of compensation whenever it is just that
he should pay; that the question of justice involves not only jus1. SzAVsy, KmETON & TrURsToN, CAsEs ON TORTs (1950).
2. In New York, by the N. Y. CODE OF PROCMUR (1848) § 62; in England,
by the JuDIcATURE ACT OF 1873, 36 & 37 VIcT. c. 66, § 74; in South Carolina,
by the CoDE or 1870 (14) § 92.
3. JusTicE OLIVER WENDELL HoLiMs, His BOOK NOTES AND UNCOLLECTED

PAXRas 45 (1936) ; cited, SrAvEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS 3 (1954).
4. John H. Wigmore, The TripartiteDivision of Torts, 8 HARV. L. Rr.v. 200
(1894) ; see also, A Summary of the Principles of Torts, in WIGMOR., SELECT
CASES ON THE LAW OF ToRTs (1912), Appendix A.
5. Professor Seavey was reporter for the RESTATEMENT or AGENCY (1933);

reporter with Professor Austin W. Scott of Harvard for the RESTATZMENT
OF R.sTiTION (1937); and advised and assisted the preparation of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934). A distinguished Massachusetts judge once told
me that he did not know there was a branch of the law that could be called
"Restitution" until he saw the RSTATEmENT. This is reminiscent of Justice
Holmes' statement above. One might hope that Mr. Seavey will follow this
volume with his cogitations on the law of restitution, a field in which he is equally expert and one even more in need of the insight his wisdom can offer. Some
other influential writings of Professor Seavey are the following: Rationale
of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859 (1920); Negligence, Subjective or Objective
41 HARV. L. REv. 6 (1927) ; cited in Judge Cardozo's opinion in the Palsgraf
case; Mr. Justice Cardoro and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REv. 372, 39
COL. L. REv. 20, 48 YALE L. J. 390 (1939) ; Restitution, (together with A. W.
Scott) 54 LAw Q. REv. 29 (1938) ; and Principles of Torts, 22 NEn. L. Rxv.
177 (1943).
6. P. 3.
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tice to the persons involved but also to the state; that although
justice may be colored by expediency, it always involves current
ideas of economics and morality; that the specific rules are but
crystallizations resulting from the meeting of competing principles in a given economic and social situation.
There are three lectures, one dealing with the historical background
from the 13th to the 19th centuries, the second with the great creative
achievement of the courts in developing the present rules, and the
third presenting the author's views on some work that remains to be
done, including the attitude he hopes the courts will take in solving
their problems. In general he finds tort law to be sound in principle
and satisfactory in providing justice to litigants in the myriad situations wherein tort problems arise. Specific rules he finds in need of
judicial correction include those dealing with contribution between
joint tort-feasor, contributory negligence, and the law dealing with
defamation and misrepresentation. Always he urges the courts to,
reject the narrow rule when it denies justice and is inconsistent with
some deeper underlying principle of tort law.
Professor Seavey presents again 7 his position on the utility of
the risk theory as a device for the just solution of problems of the
extent of liability for negligence. To him, the Cardozo view i.
Palsgrafv. Long Island R. R. Co.8 is no more than a logical development, in the light of the greater insight given by a century of analysis,
and experience, of the theory that ordinarily a man is liable for harm
which he has caused only when he is in some way at fault. 9 Thedifference between the views of Judge Cardozo in the opinion of the
court in that case, and Judge Andrews in dissent, is the difference
between having and not having a theory of liability for negligence.
Central to his thesis is the recurring strain that the doctrine of
stare decisis does not and should not have the same operative effect
in the law of torts that it has in the law dealing with crimes or with.
commercial or property interests. In the latter fields, reliance uport
the existing body of law is greater. In the field of torts, ordinarily
the only cost of a change in the decisional law is the expense of
litigating the case in which the new doctrine is announced. Seaveyshows that despite some helpful legislation, tort law is largely judgemade. It has been re-made in many instances, to further the needs
of justice in the light of new economic and social conditions.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1928).
9. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292 (Mass. 1850) is the leading case.
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Of the judges who have created this law Mr. Seavey has the highest
regard. He reads with selectivity the writings of scholars of tort
law. But for decades he has read, and pondered over, the decisions
of the judges; every decision in every jurisdiction, English or American, dealing with tort and related law. With occasional exceptions
he finds that the decisions are wise, that justice is being done, that
the law is keeping abreast of the times.
To the judges who deal with tort cases, his book should be invaluable. Counsel will present the trees to the court's attention, but
here is the forest in all its order and beauty. Here is pointed out the
deadwood that should be removed, the promising growth that should
be nurtured, the relation of the part to the whole. I think that what
Mr. Seavey calls his "simple intellectual fare" will serve the law well
for a generation to come.
CHiARIxs

H.

Rauq)AN j, Jl.*

*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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THE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SIR PATRICK HASTINGS. Roy Publishers,
New York, 1954. Pp. 302.
Sir Patrick Hastings, one of the leading English barristers, says
that these recollections were written mainly to interest his family.
But he has led an interesting and exciting life, and records it in a
readable style. He rose by his own efforts from relative poverty to
the head of the English bar, and he "held the briefs" in some of the
great trials of the past half century. The American trial lawyer
should enjoy his story, and there is no more profitable reading for
the would-be advocate than the biographies of great figures, past
and present, of bench and bar, and the accounts of famous trials.
Returning from service in the Boer War, Hastings soon decided
on a legal career. He spent the required 3 years at the Middle
Temple preparing for the bar, and it seems the hours which he could
devote to law study were very few, sirice most of his time had to be
spent in earning his living and saving the sum of 100 pounds sterling
for his admission fee to join the bar. Apparently Hastings found
this to be no disadvantage, for he notes that in the divided bar in
England, the barristers themselves are divided into two types- advocates and lawyers. From the first, he aspired to become an advocate. His mastery was in dealing with human beings, in the examination of witnesses; not in the realm of technical legal theory.
His whole career shows a goal early chosen, an unflinching pursuit
of it, a willingness and a capacity to seize every opportunity to advance himself. This is not to suggest a quality of ruthlessness; there
is no indication of success achieved at the expense of another man.
Rather the picture is one of a man dedicated to a career he loved,
and always willing to accept greater responsibility and put forth
greater efforts. For instance, in his first three months at the bar,
he spent 8 hours a day in the various Royal Courts of Justice,
studying the styles of the best advocates of the time. The rest of
the day- Hastings' days often were a full 24 hours- he would
earn his living in the Fleet, working for a newspaper.
Hastings recounts again some of the famous trials that made his
reputation. There are the murder trials of Mrs. Barney and the
"Polish Officer." There is the figure, familiar to the criminal lawyer,
of Jean Pierre Vacquier, who with smug self-satisfaction talked
himself to his death under the cross-examination of Hastings. Also,
there is the "Case of the Hooded Man."
Hastings' interests were not confined to the courtroom. "Every
man should have two professions," he says. He was a Member of
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Parliament, and was Attorney General in the Labor Government of
Ramsey McDonald in 1923, but the second profession to which he
alludes is that of playwright. He speaks with pleasure but not with
pride of hi8 plays, although they were good enough to star such
performers as Godfrey Tearle and Tallulah Bankhead, and Ronald
Coleman in a movie version.
Events of interest in his career include his clash with a French
martial court in the French zone of occupation in the Ruhr, where
he represented a German defendant, and his central role in the fall
of the McDonald Government. He constantly interjects his personal
views on all sorts of matters, law or politics, morality or war. He
is firmly convinced that no lawyer should ever take notes during a
trial, that the criminal lawyer, especially in capital cases, should
never talk to the man he defends until he faces him on the witness
stand. He vigorously supports the English view, also taken by many
of our ablest members of bench and bar, that the excesses of the
Press should be curbed where litigation is thereby likely to be seriously affected.
Of course, some of his advice is simply inapplicable to the system
of organization of the courts in America, and some of his often caustic comments on legal personalities are of no interest here because
we do not know the individuals whom he mentions. But on the
whole, his book should make pleasant reading for the American lawyer or the law student.
CHARIus H. RANDALL, JR.*

*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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ADVjNTURES IN

POLITIcs.

Richard L. Neuberger.

Oxford Univer-

sity Press, New York, 1954. Pp. 210.
Mr. Richard L. Neuberger has just taken office as United States
Senator, the first Democratic Senator to be elected from Oregon since
1914. Prior to his election in November 1954, he served in the
Oregon House of Representatives for two years and in that state's
Senate for six years. In 1950 Mrs. Neuberger was elected to the
Oregon House of Representatives, and the re-election of this husband and wife team to the legislature in 1952 attracted national
interest. They both ran ahead of General Eisenhower in their county. Together these two composed fifteen per cent of the Democratic
minority in the state's legislature- a Democratic caucus that could
be "held in bed".

Mr. Neuberger is an advocate of states rights. He believes that
state governments have surrendered a great many of their rights
to the federal government because of their weaknesses, and he sets
out to describe what he thinks these maladies are. The contention
is made that these weaknesses are so serious that state governments
are unable to deal with many problems created by global war, paralyzing depression, and rocketing inflation. Certainly the states should
have again some of their lost rights, but the author maintains that this
can be done only by strengthening the state government.

It is true that there are many weaknesses in our state governmental system, and Mr. Neuberger's illustrations of them from his experiences in Oregon stirs one to a feeling of revolt against the flaws.
Some of the criticism cannot be applied to South Carolina, but the
problems and difficulties met by a progressive state's righter in
Oregon will confront a person in any state. The legislators are
poorly paid, and their activities are usually confined to a few months
in each year. The costs of campaigns are excessive, and special
interests often exert an unwholesome influence on legislators and
other public officials. Oregon like many other states needs a new
constitution. One of the greatest difficulties is that state offices are
too frequently looked on as steps to greater things-usually in
Washington. And most of those who have become accustomed to
sharing the limelight with noted figures are unwilling to leave the
company of the influential and return home to work for better state
government. All of these weaknesses and more - many more - de-

tract from the power and prestige of state governments and from
the argument that state government can work more effectively and
efficiently than the federal government.
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There are numerous incidents related in which Mr. Neuberger
shows that legislators are often torn between their political obligations and their sense of public duty, but this is no greater problem
on the state level than on the federal plain. Already after a few
weeks in the United States Senate the author may be willing to
rewrite this as a weakness not confined to the states.
Mr. Neuberger has offered solutions to the problems that he describes although he has not suggested any new answers. He is
anxious to see more intelligent and honest people go into politics,
and he thinks that the best place for them to work is in the state
legislature. He wants to see campaign costs decreased and feels that
perhaps they should be carried by the state government. And he
says that many states should rewrite and simplify their constitutions.
However, most of the changes require a change in the attitude and
insight of the voters as well as public officer holders.
The value of the book rests on the fact that Mr. Neuberger is a
practicing and practical politician who is pointing out weaknesses
in our state governments, and the solutions to the problems of state
government coincide with the solutions proposed by non-practicing
students of government, giving them needed and added weight.
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